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Disputes over Water Resources:  





This paper presents the analysis of conflict history over freshwater in several drainage 
basins across the planet. As will be demonstrated in this paper, unilateral water policies 
have proved to reduce the role and prospect of water treaties and international water 
sharing regimes, and led to political tensions and conflicts. The main argument of the 
essay is that unilateral diversions of water flows will instigate wars between riparian 
states because of the rising demand for freshwater in the future. Unilateral practices of 
water diversion create a situation of inequitable distribution of water among nation-
states within a basin which is a prerequisite for a sustainable conflict. State policies have 
to aim to eliminate situations of inequitable distribution and increase accessibility to 
clean drinking water for populations across a river basin based on their needs in order to 
secure long-lasting peace and stability. 
 
Introduction 
The struggle for resources, whether material or symbolic, has always played a 
pivotal role in the formation and shaping of societies and polities. Over time, with the 
increase in world population and the number of nation-states, the intensity and quantity of 
conflicts for natural resources has risen at an alarming rate. Conflicts over resources are 
commonplace today as was the case for centuries earlier. How different is water and 
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rivers in particular from other types of resources? Since rivers flow through territories of 
different nation-states, the quantitative and qualitative utilization of water in one state 
affects water use in another, downstream state. As the demand for freshwater in countries 
grows, states become increasingly resolute in advocating their respective state rights and 
in defending their economic interests. Rivers can easily become the object of a 
disagreement, dispute and even conflict when the interest of one state is not accounted for 
by a neighboring riparian state. (A riparian is referred to as a state whose territory a water 
course traverses or whose boundary with another state a water course forms.) 
In this paper, I will present the analysis of conflict history in three drainage 
basins: the Aral Sea Basin, the Ganges-Brahmaputra River system, and the Tigris-
Euphrates River Basin. These river systems were selected on the basis of their history of 
transnational disputes over exploitation of water resources. Although no major military 
conflicts occurred in any of these basins, the inequitable distribution of water among 
states and population groups resulted in political tensions that may further escalate into 
warfare against the backdrop of the constantly growing demand and inadequate policies 
of states.  
Water is among the most precious resources on the planet and its importance will 
inevitably grow given the changing climatic conditions and the rising demand.  Roughly 
97 percent of the water on the Earth is salt water and thus is not readily available for 
drinking or agricultural purposes. Only 2.5 percent of the remaining water stocks are 
freshwater, but even these are unevenly distributed spatially and temporarily. Two-thirds 
of these freshwater resources are locked in glaciers and ice caps (Weinthal 2002).  One of 
the overriding realities of the early 21st century is the growing competition between 
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countries for increasingly scarce water resources. Moreover, while the amount of 
freshwater on Earth remains constant, the global population continues to increase. The 
world currently has over 6.5 billion inhabitants, a figure which is projected to climb to 
over 9 billion by 2050 (UN Population Division 2005).  The result is less water on a per 
capita basis and the growing competition for increasingly scarce water supplies. ―Water 
is a finite and fixed resource, and the rise of the global population has progressively 
reduced the world runoff per capita, from 40,000 m³ per person in 1800 to 6,840 m³ in 
1995, estimated to fall further to 4,692 m³ by 2025‖ (Furlong, Gleditsch, and Hegre 
2006).  Currently, more than one billion people do not have access to clean drinking 
water, and approximately 2.4 billion people do not have access to adequate sanitation. 
Gleick (1998) indicates that an estimated 80 percent of the diseases in developing 
countries are water-related. Every day 14 to 30 thousand people, mainly children and 
elderly, die because of waterborne diseases, or due to water floods and droughts.  
According to a United Nations study, the world‘s 263 international drainage basins 
account for some 60% of global river flows (UNEP Atlas 2002).  The study indicates that 
around 40% of the world‘s population lives in these river basins, which form at least a 
part of the territory of 145 countries.  
Water has always been a critical element of the economies in the modern age as it 
was the instrument of survival for ancient communities. Being a source of life, water 
nourished civilizations, provided fuel for conflicts and friendship between groups of 
people and individuals. Agriculture has always been and still remains the main source of 
livelihood and subsistence in most countries and the foremost consumer of freshwater. 
Nowadays, population growth creates pressures on agriculture, resulting in food 
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deficiency and insecurity. The result is the unprecedented consumption of water across 
the world. However, of the world‘s 263 internationally shared rivers, less than one in five 
is the subject of a substantial international agreement on issues of environmental 
protection, shared management, or water allocation (Conca and Dabelko 2002).  Since 
rivers provide a lion‘s share of freshwater, countries that share them are confronted with 
the necessity of reconciling their needs and demands with those of the neighboring 
countries because of the peculiar physical nature of rivers that makes them distinct from 
other types of natural resources. Unlike fossil fuels, on which states tend to claim 
absolute rights, rivers cannot be divided between the contending parties. Managing a 
river collectively by a number of countries is the inevitable necessity that all countries 
have to accept and achieve. 
Many political leaders and pundits have consistently stressed that large-scale wars 
may erupt over increasingly scarce freshwater in the future. For instance, the former 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan (2001) declared that ―fierce competition 
for freshwater may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.‖  The 2004 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Wangari Maathai (2004) suggested that: 
We face the ecological crises of deforestation, desertification, water 
scarcity and a lack of biological diversification. Unless we properly 
manage resources like forests, water, land, minerals, and oil, we will not 
win the fight against poverty. And there will be no peace. Old conflicts 
will rage on and new resource wars will erupt unless we change the path 
we are on.  
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 18, Number 2 
295 
 Other experts have dismissed such arguments as largely exaggerated and political, 
pointing to a substantial agreement among scholars that disputes over water resources fall 
short of wars and generally result in cooperative agreements. Since 1814, around 300 
treaties have been concluded about non-navigational issues relating to international water 
resources (Weinthal 2002).  Their line of research suggests that disputes over freshwater 
generally lead to cooperation rather than conflict. According to it, the ―water wars‖ 
argument does not correspond to a substantial agreement among scholars that for 
policymakers, military force is always a matter of last resort. Multiple case studies 
demonstrate that water disputes tend to fall short of conflict. For instance, Slovakia and 
Hungary found themselves in a dispute over the Danube River and the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros hydroelectric power plant project. However, unlike many cases of post-Cold 
War interstate violence, the two countries brought their contention to the International 
Court of Justice and averted direct military actions. The Mekong River Basin represents 
another example of sustainable water cooperation, notwithstanding the decades of wars 
between countries, as well as the 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan. 
However, in the latter case, the active role of the World Bank proved instrumental in 
concluding a final water agreement.  
Although experience suggests that acute water scarcity may be a factor leading to 
the conclusion of a water agreement, many agreements have proved ineffective and 
hardly went beyond the initial stages. Real cooperation has rarely been achieved. Zetoin 
and Mirumachi (2008) challenge the view that water disputes result in cooperation rather 
than war, arguing that ―various degrees of intensity and methods of conducting conflict 
tend to mask a conflict‘s existence‖ and suggest that while ―a water conflict may fall 
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short of acute violence, it still has very negative consequences that may be hidden under 
an apparent air of cooperation.‖  As a rule, various forms of cooperation are produced by 
the existence of power asymmetry among riparian nations. For instance, coerced 
cooperation is predominant in those situations where there is hegemony of one state. 
Many experts point out that Israel‘s military hegemony in the Jordan River basin resulted 
in some form of coerced cooperation. Induced cooperation generally involves a third 
party, yet the approach employed is significantly different from that of coerced 
cooperation. Induced cooperation presupposes the application of incentives for 
cooperation, instead of force. Non-partisan states and third-party institutions have the 
greatest influence on the establishment of bilateral and multilateral water regimes among 
riparian nations. The Indus Water Treaty is a good case in point where the World Bank 
played a central role in inducing Pakistan and India to come to terms about a shared 
management of their water supplies. 
Establishing Water Regulation Regimes 
There are two approaches as to how to regulate water sharing in a transboundary 
river basin. The social planner approach revolves around a supranational structure which 
is created to handle the water affairs among riparians. It assumes the delegation of 
authority and responsibility by state parties to an intergovernmental organization which is 
formed by their mutual and collective agreement: 
A central planning authority who knows what is best for society – a social 
planner who views the region as one planning unit. The social planner 
maximizes regional welfare subject to all available water resources in the 
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region and given all possible water utilizing sectors. In some instances, the 
social planner also includes preferences. (Wolf 1996, 18) 
The second approach centers on market regulation, whereby each riparian nation 
pursues individual gains from the engagement in a basin-wide bargaining game. Game 
theory provides a conceptual reference point for a market-driven water regime. The 
efficient allocation of scarce water resources among states is achieved via market 
approaches.  However, Wolf questions the utility of the market-centered approach, 
claiming that ―economic considerations alone may not provide an acceptable solution to 
water allocation problems, especially allocation disputes between nations‖ (Wolf 1996, 
19).  
Game theoretical approaches constitute the core of multiriparian water regimes. 
The basic assumption of game theory is that decision makers are rational players, that 
they are intelligent, so, while pursuing well-defined objectives, they take into account 
other decision-makers‘ rationality and build expectations on their behavior (Dinar, Dinar, 
McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007).  The involved countries are acting as players with 
specific options and thus form strategies according to the corresponding payoffs and the 
counter-player‘s strategies (Eleni and Yannis 2008).  Each country-player adopts a 
certain strategy provoking the reaction of the opponent party, while all the actions are 
characterized by a rational behavior aimed at the maximization of payoffs. ―One of the 
main characteristics of the theory is the cooperative approach, which can be utilized 
effectively in competitive cases – proving the benefits of cooperation and converting the 
players‘ relations in cooperative‖ (Eleni and Yannis 2008, 467).  The overriding principle 
is that a military conflict between states is unacceptable within the realm of game 
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theoretical approaches. However, a conflict of interests is central to driving a market 
water system. It facilitates the progress of a water regime. Open bargaining techniques 
and the transparency of interactive processes between players provide strong conciliatory 
mechanisms. 
Yaron (2002) applies game theory models to assess the economic value of 
cooperation and noncooperation between Israelis and Palestinians over their shared water 
resources. He concludes that whether or not a solution to the regional water problem will 
be of a cooperative or noncooperative nature will depend on several political, institutional 
and economic considerations that may or may not be in place (Yaron 2002).  Using a 
game theory model, Dinar and Wolf (1994) evaluate the idea of trading hydroelectricity 
for interbasin water transfers among neighboring nations.  They attempt to develop a 
broader, more realistic conceptual framework that addresses economic and political 
issues. Their model allocates potential benefits from trade among cooperators. The main 
findings are that economic merits exist for water transfers in the region, but political 
considerations may harm the process.  
As the process of globalization drives the world toward a more interconnected 
realm of interdependent, albeit sovereign states, the nature of the norms that regulate the 
relations between nation-states transforms rapidly. Unlike the traditional international 
system of sovereign states, the yet infant transnational system of global governance seeks 
to establish supranational laws, regulations, and institutions whose authority extends 
beyond and within nation-states. Nation-states continue to exist, but they must be 
subordinate to transnational authority and laws. This authority is exercised by the 
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definitions of international law, transnational courts and myriad UN conventions that 
establish global norms.  
The UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(1997) embodies the first international effort to resolve the perpetual conflict of interests 
over water use. It stresses the utilization of rivers in an ―equitable and reasonable 
manner‖, taking into consideration the geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, 
ecological and other factors of a national character, as well as the social and economic 
needs of the watercourse states concerned. In addition, the Convention underscores that 
the interests of all populations dependent on a watercourse be respected and supported by 
all possible means.  
Under the Convention, if an upstream country is in a dire need to construct a dam 
in its territory, it has to be done in such a way as not to infringe the water rights of the 
populations in the neighboring countries and not to cause a substantial harm to the 
ecology of the entire basin. The UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses is considered to be an international framework agreement for 
use by states in negotiating water disputes. Most importantly, it put to rest the 
longstanding conflict between the principles of absolute territorial sovereignty, or the 
Harmon Doctrine; and absolute territorial integrity. The Harmon Doctrine advocates for 
the right of an upstream state to do as it wishes with the water in its territory—regardless 
of the adverse affect on downstream states; whereas the Convention defends the right of a 
downstream state to an uninterrupted flow of a fixed quantity of water from upstream 
states. The main principle enshrined in the Convention is that of the limited territorial 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 18, Number 2 
300 
sovereignty. It underscores the equitable utilization and the obligation not to cause a 
significant harm.  
The Convention is to be used as a reference point in each of the transboundary 
river basins. Today, however, most riparians tend to advocate for the principles that are in 
line with their sovereign economic interests—that is, upstream countries often refer to the 
principle of absolute territorial sovereignty when advocating their plans to unilaterally 
use water flows; and downstream countries support the principle of absolute territorial 
integrity because it renders their water flows unaltered. Only 16 out of 35 countries 
needed for the Convention to enter into force have ratified, accepted, approved or 
acceded to it (Dinar, Dinar, McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007).  Solid basin-wide 
cooperation requires the unanimous commitment to the principle of equitable utilization 
of watercourses enshrined in the Convention and the subsequent participation in the 
benefits derived from the water by all communities sharing the basin.  
The UN Convention encourages the institution of international water regimes to 
initiate and sustain water sharing and protect the environment. Currently, there are 
different perspectives as to how international water regimes are founded.  According to a 
realist perspective, international water regimes form because of a sharp asymmetry in the 
military and economic power among states. Consequently, international regimes are 
created to serve the interests of hegemonic powers and when their potentials decline, 
regimes weaken and collapse. In contrast, neoliberals contend that international regimes 
come into being as a result of demand. While different situations exhibit various forms of 
cooperation with varying degrees of coercion, the demand for regimes is always present 
where a river is shared by at least two countries.  
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A comprehensive water regime needs to include a wide array of solutions so as to 
accommodate the diverse interests, strategies and values. Dinar and Wolf (1997) argue 
that economic efficiency alone is not sufficient for cooperation, especially when it is 
related to the allocation of a scarce resource, such as water.  Furthermore, the authors 
develop a framework for analyzing the economic and political aspects of cooperation and 
demonstrate, using the case of trading Nile water, how regional cooperative arrangements 
based only on economic considerations are inferior to arrangements that likewise take 
into account political considerations.  
Just and Netanyahu (2004) discuss cooperation in the context of a multiriparian 
river basin. According to them, coalitions are more sustainable when they incorporate a 
smaller number of players, rather than a larger number.  This may be relevant in cases 
where cooperation is lacking, yet a large number of riparians can make treaty formation 
difficult, if not impossible. The authors argue that multilateral coordination in river basins 
with a large number of riparians may have to be preceded by bilateral agreements first – 
since they are easier to sustain. Nevertheless, bilateral treaty formation can be conducive 
to the alliance-building processes within a basin, whereby states or groups thereof can 
become confronted on water issues. By and large, bilateral treaty formation occurs 
between countries similarly positioned in terms of geopolitical influence or where the 
convergence of their strategic and economic interests is significant. Otherwise, a grand 
coalition incorporating all river riparians is the solution. However difficult to accomplish, 
it is associated with the highest total benefit from cooperation. 
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The Assessment of Conflict Probability in the Aral Sea Basin 
 With the demise of the Soviet Union, Central Asia became engulfed in the cycles 
of interstate disputes related to the utilization of regional waters. The Amu Darya and the 
Syr Darya Rivers have become the main sources of contention after the five republics 
gained their independence and the central authority in Moscow was no longer responsible 
for handling the regional water affairs. Common ideological and political goals gave way 
to sovereign nation-building projects in which water is used as a strategic instrument of 
exerting the political pressure on the neighboring states and an impetus for economic 
growth and social development. The rivers are now part of intensive debates between 
upstream and downstream nations.  
The Aral Sea Basin is formed by two of the largest rivers of Central Asia – the 
Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. The source of the Amu Darya is largely in Tajikistan, 
with a few watercourses originating in northeastern Afghanistan. The Syr Darya 
originates mainly in Kyrgyzstan. The Basin covers the areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as the southern part of Kazakhstan and the 
northern part of Afghanistan and Iran (Dukhovny, Sokolov and Mukhamadiev 2006).  
Tajikistan contributes 80% of the flow generated in the Amu Darya river basin, followed 
by Afghanistan (8%), Uzbekistan (6%) and Kyrgyzstan (3%). Turkmenistan and Iran 
together contribute around 3%. Although it carries less water than the Amu Darya, the 
Syr Darya is the longest river in Central Asia. It flows from the Tien Shan Mountains, 
along the borders of and across four states – Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan – before flowing into the Aral Sea. Kyrgyzstan contributes 74% of the river 
flow, followed by Kazakhstan (12%), Uzbekistan (11%) and Tajikistan (3%). Both rivers 
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have an extended network of dams, reservoirs and irrigation canals, resulting in one of 
the most sophisticated water systems in the world.  
The old Soviet water sharing system remained in place until recently when the 
countries became confronted with the sky-rocketed world prices on fossil fuels and when 
the old system of barter deals proved inefficient devoid of the central command authority. 
The inability to purchase natural gas from abroad forced Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to 
switch in the operation of their main water reservoirs from irrigation to power generation. 
This resulted in a change of the natural regime of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya 
rivers. Winter floods became frequent and river runoff during the vegetation period was 
considerably reduced. This resulted in the reduction of the productivity of irrigated areas 
and increased the economic losses in irrigation farming in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
especially during low-water periods. 
Today, water policies are antagonizing neighbors and in some cases leading to 
conflict. Current water management practices, where each state is exploiting water at the 
expense of its neighbors while paying no respect to cooperation, are not sustainable. 
Soviet engineers designed the water regulation system in such a way as to provide 
downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with sufficient amounts of water during their 
crop seasons in the summer, whereas the hydroelectric facilities in the territories of 
upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were intended to control water flows, generate 
electricity and prevent flooding. Downstream riparian nations were the core of the Soviet 
plans of expanding their agricultural productivity, mainly through water-thirsty crops – 
cotton and rice. The gargantuan river diversion projects that were intended to feed the 
extensive irrigation networks ultimately led to the most devastating environmental and 
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social impacts in the entire Aral Sea Basin. The fourth largest lake in the world had lost 
two-thirds of its original volume in a matter of few decades. Accompanied by the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, it led to severe economic impacts for the nations of 
the region. Industries and communities that depended on the sea vanished and 
competition for increasingly scarce water has been rising among the growing populations 
ever since. The aspirations of the Soviet leaders to surpass the West during the Cold War 
by all means, including human and environmental, resulted in enormous costs that 
continue to plague the entire region. 
By early 1980s, the Soviet Union became the second largest cotton producer in 
the world, accounting for nearly 20 percent of the world‘s production. To achieve 
economic growth, Soviet planners thus allocated most of the available water resources in 
Central Asia to develop and support a monocrop economy, not taking into account the 
social costs in terms of the health of the population and the consequences for the 
environment (Weinthal 2002).  Allouche (2007) claims that the Central Asian water crisis 
is more the result of bad management and disproportionate allocation among the riparians 
than the consequence of scarcity.  The deeply flawed management system, endemic 
corruption, poor irrigation networks, weak governance structures, absence or lack of 
political will and a reduction in external involvement and investments all contribute to 
and exacerbate the crisis in the Aral Sea Basin.  
While outright resource wars have been avoided, the five nations have been at 
odds with each other adopting a zero-sum attitude – each country acts to maximize its 
water allocation to either sustain high levels of cotton cultivation or produce excess 
amounts of hydroelectricity for exporting purposes without reference to regional needs, 
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planning, or the consequences to the environment of the basin. Cotton cultivation evolved 
into the dominant economic activity in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 
Uzbekistan alone, the cotton sector produced more than 65 percent of the republic‘s gross 
domestic output, consumed 60 percent of all resources, and employed approximately 40 
percent of the labor force by the mid 1980s; the republic accounted for approximately 
two-thirds of the cotton produced in the Soviet Union (Weinthal 2002).  
The countries of Central Asia are among the poorest in the world in terms of their 
GDP and per capita incomes. The majority of the population in the republics is employed 
in the agricultural sector and is highly dependent on subsistence crops. The aspirations of 
upstream countries to increase their hydropower generation capacities by constructing 
massive dams and power generation facilities without a proper consideration of the 
potential environmental and political effects threatens to disrupt the existing regional 
agreements and lead to conflicts. The Rogun dam, in Tajikistan, is planned for a height of 
335 meters. The construction started in 1976, but never finished since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and Tajikistan‘s subsequent civil war brought construction to a halt in 1991. 
Now the Tajik government plans to complete the project without regard to the principles 
enshrined in the UN framework convention. Unilateral diversion of river flow will 
diminish the existing level of cooperation in the region and lead to contention. The 
construction of the Rogun dam, which Tajikistan sees as the only viable solution to the 
ongoing economic recession, will substantially reduce the river flow in downstream 
countries. The dam is being built on the Vakhsh River. It includes other riparian states 
that might be seriously affected by the disruption of river flow.  
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 18, Number 2 
306 
The impounding of a reservoir behind a dam generally reduces the water flow 
downstream to zero. It is during this period that conflicts are most likely to erupt. For 
instance, the impounding of the Ataturk Dam in Turkey impeded the water flow of the 
Euphrates River in Syria and Iraq for one month. Although no open military conflicts 
occurred over that period, the countries officially protested unilateral undertakings of 
such nature. Water facilities can become targets for airstrikes and ground military 
operations that may well escalate into a large-scale interstate war. 
However, even if Tajikistan were able to attract the necessary investments for the 
projects, the country would encounter significant problems in selling the surplus power 
generated, as the current electrical energy grid in the region is focused in Tashkent, the 
capital of Uzbekistan. To resolve this problem, Tajikistan is teaming up with Kyrgyzstan 
to create a north-south transmission line to link the two states with Kazakhstan and 
bypass Uzbekistan altogether (Allouche 2007).  Most recently, Tajikistan‘s government 
launched the Initial Public Offering (IPO) to facilitate nation-wide investments for the 
Rogun power plant project. International donor organizations and external state actors 
refuse to invest in such projects as they tend to destabilize the political situation and 
create environmental hazards. 
Large-scale unilateral construction projects on rivers can be vulnerable to attacks 
by the opposing countries, such as in case of Israel and Syria. Israel conducted airstrikes 
against targets in Syria when it attempted to disrupt the water flow to Israel by building 
dams on the Jordan River. Once built, however, dams act as deterrents of interstate 
conflict. Massive hydroelectric facilities, such as dams, are large enough to pose an 
enormous environmental threat to the entire region in case of destruction or significant 
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damage. As a result, a protective aura of illegitimacy also develops to make attacks on 
these targets less likely after they are built. For example, although the Israelis have stated 
that they do not regard the Aswan High Dam as off-limits to military attack, they are 
aware of the enormous price they would have to pay in international condemnation, costs 
to the ecosystem and populations of the basin. If such a major hydro installation were 
attacked, the reaction on the part of the victim would be extreme. Therefore, large-scale 
hydro facilities probably restrain conflict, yet if attacked, they seriously aggravate it.  
Upstream countries have not been able to produce sufficient amounts of hydroelectricity 
because the water levels in their reservoirs remained low as a result of climatic changes 
in the basin.  The degrading water supply system will soon become inoperable, if further 
investments are not secured to finance their reconstruction and replacement. The 
population of Central Asia is expected to double in the next fifty years. Unilateral 
development projects on rivers can only aggravate water scarcity and provoke some form 
of hostility. Therefore, it is highly important to make a special consideration not only of 
the potential dangers to the environment, but also of the social and economic costs that 
such projects are likely to produce across the border.  
Weinthal (2002) asserts that international aid organizations and INGOs had 
contributed to enhancing the regional cooperation and reinforced the republics‘ 
sovereignty in early to late-1990s. According to her, the absence of substantial interstate 
water conflicts in the region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union can be explained by 
the desire of the elites in the five republics to consolidate statehood through the 
accumulation of credibility and international recognition. In other words, it was in the 
national interests of all republics to cooperate on water issues. The active role of the 
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international community in the form of IOs and NGOs impels institution building at both 
the international and the domestic level by simultaneously inducing cooperation and 
reinforcing empirical sovereignty. ―If these transnational actors did not behave 
purposively and assume such a comprehensive role, other outcomes might have 
transpired such as inertia, a different form of state building, or a lack of cooperation‖ 
(Weinthal 2002, 67).  
However, now that the states have gained a degree of international recognition, 
they more often tend to ignore the principles set forth in the 1992 Almaty Declaration. 
Efforts to institute an effective regional water governance system have proved 
ineffective, and increasing tensions are threatening regional security. Without genuine 
cooperation in the region, one might expect political and economic instability, and 
increased local violence. The 1992 agreement on water sharing in Central Asia 
represented a quick response to a very fluid and ambiguous situation. It did not constitute 
sustainable environmental cooperation among independent actors with well-defined 
interests. Weinthal (2002) explains the initial success of cooperative efforts as inertia – 
―not wanting to disrupt from past practices, especially since the leaders were essentially 
concerned with bringing in the cotton harvest‖ (p. 125).  The Almaty Agreement 
established the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), which was 
composed of the five ministers of water management. The ICWC has a number of 
deficiencies that inhibit the functioning of the organization in an adequate fashion. The 
most important one is that this institution has been created under a strong influence of 
international organizations and states have been quite reluctant to cooperate thereafter. 
The result is that many commitments and agreements are not honored. Another problem 
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lies in the structural nature of the organization, flawed representation scheme, and the 
location of the headquarters in Uzbekistan, making it appear as a special-interest 
institution.  
Water Tensions in South Asia 
 The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River basin covers the areas of China, India, 
Bhutan and Bangladesh. The GBM basin is the most populous area in the world with a 
population density of around 700 per sq. km. The basin as a whole, covers approximately 
1% of the Earth‘s total land surface, is home to 10% of the world‘s population and 
contains the largest concentration of poor on the planet (Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf 
2002).  Moreover, the region experiences one of the highest population growth rates in 
the world. Political collisions and military conflicts among nations have become common 
after the partition of the British India into the independent states of India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. 
Water occupies a critical niche in the domestic economies of all countries and the 
demands for freshwater resources will undoubtedly increase along with the rising 
consumption. ―Agriculture accounts for nearly one-half of all freshwater usage in the 
basin, making water supply one of the most significant barriers to economic 
development‖ (Dinar, Dinar, McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007, 254).  The GBM system is 
considered to be one transboundary river basin even though the three rivers of this system 
have certain distinct characteristics and flow through very different regions for most parts 
of their lengths. The disproportionate spatial and temporal distribution of water flows 
results in some adverse environmental effects. For instance, during the monsoon season, 
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from June to October, there is abundant water, but during non-monsoon months the 
countries become water-stressed (Rahaman 2006).  
The conflict over the Ganges water between Bangladesh and India dates back to 
1951 when India decided to construct the Farakka Barrage in order to divert water from 
the Ganges to the Hooghly River by a 42-kilometer long feeder canal (Rahaman 2006).  
The unilateral diversion of the Ganges water by India at Farakka Barrage has caused a 
series of adverse environmental and ecological problems in Bangladesh (Khalequzzaman 
1993).  The Farakka Barrage gave India significant control over the water flow in 
Bangladesh. Since most of Bangladesh‘s water sources originate outside its territory, it 
became vulnerable to any quantitative and qualitative impacts caused by actions in India. 
These impacts include shortage of water flow in the dry season affecting irrigated 
agriculture and devastating floods in the wet season. The Farakka Barrage has 
contributed to 50% decline in the dry season flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh (Dinar, 
Dinar, McCaffrey, and McKinney 2007).  Wilson questions the utility of the Farakka 
Barrage: 
It is difficult to tell how far it has contributed to the increase in the draught 
of the Hooghy, but it has not rescued Calcutta Port. The decline of the port 
was not caused by physical constraints on the river, but by the slow rate of 
industrial growth in the hinterland of the port. (Crow, Lindquist, and 
Wilson 1995, 158) 
 India prefers to negotiate water sharing with its neighbors bilaterally whose 
leaders have signed separate treaties, agreements and memorandums with Nepal, Bhutan 
and Pakistan on water sharing of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Indus rivers, respectively. 
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Bangladesh prefers the involvement of all riparians in the designing of a regional water 
resources development plan. Bangladesh, as a weaker nation, has long been trying to 
attract the attention of the international community to the problem of deficient water 
supplies as a result of India‘s actions upstream. The lack of a workable management plan 
for water allocation to Bangladesh has created a situation where irrigation of crops and 
navigation are impossible during the summer months. Although the 1995 Water Treaty 
between India and Bangladesh explicitly upholds the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization of water supplies, the Treaty does not provide any mechanism to 
approach other riparian countries of the Ganges basin for finding out a long-term 
sustainable solution of the current crisis and for integrated management of the basin 
(Rahaman 2006).  In addition, the Joint River Commission has not been equipped with a 
significant political authority and responsibility to implement the terms of the Treaty. 
This constitutes a serious impediment to the achievement of a solid bilateral cooperation 
between the two countries. There remains little doubt that if countries like India remain 
reluctant to discuss or address the question of water allocation on a multilateral basis, 
problems of water scarcity will persist and populations will be facing even greater 
economic challenges. This can threaten the regional peace and lead to internal instability, 
growing terrorist activities and international conflicts. It is essential for the hegemonic 
countries to engage in the multilateral negotiation of allocation and regulation of shared 
water resources.  
Cooperation over the Indus River between India and Pakistan is a demonstration 
of the potential for collaborative action yet to be explored in the GBM basin. Despite the 
cycles of interstate hostility between the two countries, nuclear test explosions, ongoing 
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terrorist activities in the region, the Indus Water Treaty remained intact and continued to 
function. The agreement over the Indus River allowed for the division of the river‘s 
tributaries between India and Pakistan. The nature of the agreement and the involvement 
of the World Bank in the negotiation of the Treaty contributed to building cooperative 
relations between the two countries. In the end, the World Bank became signatory to the 
Indus Water Treaty.  
Collaboration between Bhutan and India represents a salient example of how 
transboundary water bodies can be used as an engine for economic growth or 
development of an impoverished region with concomitant benefits to each country 
(Biswas 2008).  Following water cooperation initiatives have meant that Bhutan‘s per 
capita GDP has increased from being the lowest of any South Asian countries in 1980s, 
to being the second highest in the region at present, within a very brief time span of only 
a little more than two decades (Biswas 2008).  Many experts suggest that exploring 
Nepal‘s extensive hydro potential collectively could boost the regional welfare. Bhaduri 
proposes that a market-based water transfer has great relevance in resolving the 
transboundary water conflict between India and Bangladesh (Bhaduri and Barbier 2003).  
Water transfers from Nepal would augment the flow of water at Farakka during dry 
seasons and periods of drought.  
Ultimately, the efforts to eradicate terrorism and diminish interstate hostility will 
largely depend on how well all countries of South Asia and the international community 
will commit themselves to addressing the problems of endemic poverty, low living 
standards, lack of access to adequate water supplies and the spread of disease by 
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promoting a cohesive and joint water regulation system. India‘s cooperation in addressing 
the regional economic challenges is of foremost importance for success.  
The Dynamics of Water Tensions in the Tigris-Euphrates River Basin 
 The Tigris and the Euphrates river systems are often considered to form a single 
basin because both rivers in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway converge shortly before 
emptying into the Persian Gulf. Both rivers originate in Turkey, traverse Syria and Iraq. 
The Euphrates River is the longest in the Middle East. It originates in the eastern part of 
Turkey, between Lake Van and Black Sea. It is estimated that 40% of the Euphrates 
River is confined by Turkey‘s boundaries, while 25% is in Syria and 35% in Iraq. 
According to Akanda, Freeman, and Placht (2007), disputes over water allocation 
between the three countries are likely to aggravate in the future.  Driven by a number of 
objectives, the riparian countries have often been at odds over the utilization of the 
Euphrates River waters. Food and energy security are the primary concerns for Iraq and 
Turkey. Population growth amplifies the demand placed on food and energy supplies and 
increases the prospect of further discontent over the existing water allocation quotas. 
Both Syria and Iraq have announced their goals of developing food sufficiency programs, 
whereas Turkey‘s hydro-energy development plans threaten to undermine any of the 
proposed downstream projects without a joint consultation and management strategy.  
Being an upstream country, Turkey enjoys a substantial degree of control over the 
Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers. The initiation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project 
(GAP) by Turkey has created exceeding pressures on the water system of the rivers. The 
project includes the construction of 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants and irrigation 
facilities to serve 1.7 million hectares of land, totally owned by the local population of 
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the region (Kibaroglu and Unver 2000).  Turkey aspires to reduce the dependence on 
expensive fuel imports by producing at least 40 percent of its required energy from 
domestic hydroelectric sources. The GAP hydroelectric project was expected to save the 
country about 28 million tons of oil imports annually. In 2001, Syria and Iraq were net 
exporters of fuel as opposed to Turkey, which, significantly had to import approximately 
63 percent of fuel (Akanda, Freeman, and Placht 2007).  Turkey‘s leaders often refer to 
the country‘s hydro resources as their only natural assets; in the same manner oil is 
treated in Iraq and Syria. As was mentioned earlier, claiming absolute rights on river 
flows poses dangers to international peace in the region. Turkey‘s leaders contend that 
while the water is in Turkish territory, it is the sole property of Turkey. Turkey may 
choose to obstruct, divert, sell or even share it, but the water flows remain the exclusive 
property of Turkey just as oil is the property of the Arab state in which it sits. ―However, 
as the modern move away from the Harmon Doctrine and recent internationally adopted 
definitions of watercourses illustrate, the comparison drawn between Arab oil and the 
waters of the Euphrates-Tigris is inaccurate‖ (Hakki 2006, 9).  ―The loss of one-half and 
two-thirds of Iraqi and Syrian water supply, respectively, from the Euphrates Basin is a 
viable cause for alarm‖ (Hakki, 2006, 4).  
Turkey is the only country in the Euphrates basin to not have signed the UN 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. According to 
sources in Turkey, if signed, the Convention would give the other riparian nations a veto 
power over Turkey‘s development projects. The GAP project has strong political 
implications since it aims to develop the part of the country mainly populated by ethnic 
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Kurds. This would enable the Turkish elites to consolidate their rule throughout the 
nation and eliminate all forms of dissent.  
Syria and Iraq insist on the equal division of waters of both rivers, while Turkey 
contends that the equality approach would not meet its energy and agriculture needs and 
instead proposes an equity-centered solution. Turkey‘s leaders maintain that their 
population demands are higher than in the neighboring countries; therefore, pursuing 
higher water allocations from the Tigris-Euphrates system is in line with international 
normative standards.  
Ultimately, it is probable that Turkey will be compelled to negotiate a feasible 
water agreement in order to secure a peaceful regional environment. International peace 
is the essential condition for promoting the domestic economic growth and development 
– the fact that the leaders of all riparian countries have to accept and achieve. More 
importantly, Turkey is obliged to engage in the trilateral talks concerning appropriate 
water allocations in order to secure external funding and membership in the European 
Union. Syria and Iraq are also expected to participate in the water negotiations in order to 
win the international trust and recognition in the wake of the internal political instability 
in these countries. The riparian countries have a full potential to stimulate the processes 
leading to the formation of a basin-wide economic system and an integrated water 
management structure whose underlying goal would be to promote the sharing of benefits 
among nations. Enhanced trade links will inevitably reduce interstate hostility and 
suspicion. It will be important to include Iraq in any of the cooperative arrangements so 
as to foster a basin-wide effort. Interdependency links engendered by a collective 
management of water will assist in the transition processes in Iraq and help build a solid 
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market economy and free society there after decades of political turmoil. Hakki (2006) 
asserts that ―one way in which Turkey might contribute to alleviating the water dispute 
with Syria and Iraq is through exportation of electricity through bargain prices‖ (p. 16).  
In return, the countries can supply oil and gas to Turkey and receive sufficient amounts of 
water for irrigation and consumption. 
Experience suggests that external actors, whether countries or international 
organizations, can be instrumental in initiating a dialogue between the three countries. 
Akanda, Freeman, and Placht (2007) propose that ―only an external mediator has the 
ability to highlight the incentives and frame the issues in such a way that each country 
believes it has something to gain by coming to the table and something to lose by 
avoiding negotiations‖ (p. 5).  Each country has put forward an approach for how water 
should be shared in the region. Syria and Iraq propose the vastly different methodology 
of sharing river flows. The task for the mediators would be to reconcile these diverging 
approaches to shared rivers. 
Conclusions and Implications for the Future 
The case studies examined in this article demonstrate that unilateral diversion of 
rivers can provoke political and military tensions and destabilize the economic security in 
drainage basins. Water scarcity will add fuel to interstate contention and instigate water 
wars absent proper precautionary measures. Population growth, environmental 
deterioration and climate change conditions may diminish the quality and quantity of 
potable water, result in natural disasters of even greater magnitude and further increase a 
social discontent across the planet. Under these adverse circumstances, unilateral 
diversion of water flows can ignite international conflicts and lead to significant human 
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and environmental losses. The unprecedented global population growth will inevitably 
stimulate the competition for freshwater and create extreme pressures on governments, 
under which it will be difficult to ignore the interests of all riparian nations while 
pursuing sovereign economic interests associated with the exploitation of water flows.  
Many studies related to water resources underscore that disputes over freshwater 
tend to fall short of conflicts and generally result in a peaceful resolution. Yoffe et al. 
(2004) found that international relations over freshwater resources are overwhelmingly 
cooperative and cover a wide range of issue areas, including water quantity, quality, joint 
management and hydropower.  However, in the future, certain river basins may be more 
likely to give rise to interstate hostility than others because of record-breaking population 
and poverty growth rates. The falling availability of freshwater on a per capita basis in 
the developing world can easily provoke a social discontent and lead to a large-scale 
warfare between and within countries. It is therefore imperative to direct more resources 
and potential into these regions in order to mitigate these dire situations, promote and 
sustain multinational water regimes and the sharing of benefits from the collective 
exploitation of water flows.  
Unilateral practices of water diversion are conducive to inequitable distribution of 
water quantities which provides fertile ground for contention and conflict among nation-
states and social groups. Social and economic security of populations is essential for 
promoting and sustaining peace in river basins. Inequitable distribution of water among 
states fosters perceptions of injustice and situations of insecurity among populations of 
river basins and results in ways of seeking redress that go beyond the limits set forth by 
international legal norms and treaties. State policies have to aim to promote the rights of 
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populations to freshwater and to the benefits from the exploitation of water flows not 
only within the territorial confines of their nation-states but also with an eye on the needs 
for water across their borders so as to achieve a basin-wide peace and sustainable 
economic development. Since peace is the essential condition for the long-term 
development and stability, states have to increasingly accommodate the interests of all 
the populations inhabiting a river basin as it will maximize the benefits of multinational 
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